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CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
The Terrorsof Dealingwith
September 11tb
SnocO: JOfn ri. iviowuTray
A to suppress terrorism have proved far from
satisfy, Ihe events of Sept. 11 stunned us out of our usual
st, hat human beings could actually be willing to
thcqli ,es as long as their demise includes innocents
consi idels or enemies by association. To fathom
someone fashioning an airliner filled with innocent passengers
into a missile to incinerate buildings and the innocents inside to
is too difficult to fathom. Responsible people and government
must protect themselves after such an atrocity.
Part of the protection must include answering the question:
how it is possible for leaders to inflame such ferocious fear and
hatred to prompt their minions to commit this pathological and
unjustifiable horror? Similarly, if we actually wish to prevent it
in the future, we not only need to take protective and
preventive measures, we also must resolve the problem of
whether it is possible that U.S. actions somehow might play a
synergistic role by playing into the hands of those who wish to
foment hatred against us. Whether or not this is true, nothing
justifies the atrocity of Sept. 11. Indeed, the tu quoque defense
(you did it too) has been repudiated, at least since the
Nuremberg Trials.
The atrocities caused the U.S. to take three approaches in
an attempt to claim some justice. The first was to attack the
perpetrators and their supporters militarily, diplomatically, and
economically. The second was to capture and prepare to
prosecute some of them; and the third, much more questionable,
was to capture and keep them incommunicado indefinitely.
International criminal law provides important insight for
analyzing these approaches, including their legal limits. It
behooves soldiers, political leaders, defense counsel, prosecutors,
legislators, judges, and legal scholars in criminal law and
international law to develop a more refined understanding of
these issues and international criminal law, considered exotic
prior to Sept. 11.
The post-Sept. 11 world requires questioning of traditional
law of armed conflict and how it may apply to terrorism. For
development of a viable and worthy rule of law, it is necessary to
fashion a meaningful and useful definition of terrorism, and
what might be a proper legal response to it.
Formal belligerency is an anachronism. Warfare has
changed to the point that it is difficult to make sense of
distinctions between terrorism, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. Perhaps we are in a phase of world history in which
the norm is continual low-level, but horrific warfare. Some
recent wars would meet the traditional definition of
belligerency, although they are often civil wars: the wars in
Rwanda, in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, or East Timor.
Others, like Palestine, the Sept. 11 attacks, the troubles in
Northern Ireland do not meet the definition. Small, loosely
organized groups with access to weapons or other means of
destruction foment continual armed strife and terror. Perhaps, in
this way, we have devolved into an existence similar to that
prior to the birth of the nation state, where power and war are
not state-based. Traditional international law must be refined to
address the new circumstances.
Jus in bello leaves no doubt that even during all out war,
certain conduct violates international humanitarian law.2
Conventional and customary international law traditionally has
proscribed certain universal crimes, including: war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. The Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, For the Protection of War Victims, provide
an illustrative listing,3 expanded by Article 85 of Protocol I,
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1977).4
International Criminal Law & Terrorism
Terrorism is not formally categorized as a crime in the Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court (the ICC). Certain
forms of terrorism clearly fit conceptually within ICC
proscription as a crime against humanity, but formal inclusion as
a distinct offense has been debated from the beginning. In the
1998 Rome negotiations, representatives of Algeria, India, Sri
Lanka, and Turkey proposed explicit inclusion.5 The major
reason it was not included was the politically based difficulty in
defining the term and fear of politicizing the tribunal. Since
Sept. 11, momentum has increased toward inserting terrorism
into the Statute.6 To do this will require a clear definition and
elaborated elements.
Criminalizing terrorism with integrity is difficult. States
often adopt anti-terrorism rhetoric, but actually commit or
support terrorism. They often pass laws or enter into treaties,
which although based on international law and principles of
universality, actually condemn only their enemy's conduct, but
legitimize their own actions. Lawmakers, thus, mock the rule of
law and actually promote terrorism. They appropriate the term
and the law for propagandistic purposes. An example is when
terrorism is deemed rhetorically to be a generic universal crime
transcending time and space, 7 but is suppressed or prosecuted
only when it occurs within a specified period of time and place.8
Acts of terror committed within the former Yugoslavia after
1991, serve as an example. Alternatively, sometimes legislation
and treaties calling for "universal jurisdiction" will adopt a
racial, cultural, ethnic, or religious stereotyping - calling for the
deportation or arrest of the exotic "Islamic terrorist." Bias,
discrimination, and demonization of "the enemy," arouse fear
and hatred, while they exclude "one's own kind."9
We frequently hear comments like: "the terrorists did not
care about our innocent civilians, so why should we care about
theirs?" Thus, we are easily beguiled into using terror-tactics
directly to fight terrorism or to use terror-tactics in disguise,
claiming "collateral damage." Certainly, this is a problem, as
most, if not all, groups who use terrorism, believe that their
goals are more important than the damage done by their
terrorism. True believers in a "just cause" rationalize their own
conduct as just, even when they would consider that same
conduct committed against them for whatever reason to be
terrorism.
Oppression does constitute a form of terrorism. On the
other hand, real or perceived oppression becomes a facile excuse
to slaughter innocents, because it is easier. This may breed
terroristic reaction. We hope, for example, that reports in June
2002 that, "American soldiers have been involved in the torture
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and murder of captured prisoners, and may have aided in the
'disappearance' of up to 3,000 men in the region of Mazar-i-
Sharif," according to Jamie Doran, an Irish documentary film
maker, in his documentary entitled "Massacre at Mazar."10 The
Pentagon has denied this, stating that the torture claims are
"highly suspect in the face of it" and has denied outright the
claim that U.S. soldiers participated in the massacre of the
3,000 Islamic fighters who surrendered to the Northern
Alliance." Still, if our agents did this we are responsible.
The Need to Define Terrorism
It is necessary and possible to define terrorism in a manner
that accommodates the rule of law. Our definition must be
neutral and serious. Our reaction to it must be moral and legal.
Otherwise, we become what we are fighting. To try to have it
both ways is ultimately self-destructive. Survival as a democracy
requires recognition that we must ensure our definitions and
reactions are the same for everyone. We cannot do what they do
and we must react within the rule of law.
Comparing terrorism to war crimes and crimes against
humanity helps.12 These traditional offenses are less poorly
defined than terrorism, but they do suffer from sufficient
vagueness, potentially to violate basic constitutional and
criminal law principles. Proof of an actus reus and a mens rea are
necessary. The mens rea for a "grave breach" under the Geneva
Conventions or for terrorism is intent or recklessness.13
Recklessness may include common law depraved heart murder.
The Preparatory Committee (PREPCOM) for the ICC deemed
the general mens rea to be intent, knowledge, or both.14 The
actus reus for murder as a crime against humanity is an act or
omission causing the death of "protected persons. 15 "Protected
persons," are "innocents," including prisoners of war or captured
persons of the opposing military, or innocent civilians.
Therefore, causing death by starvation, execution without a
fair trial, torture or ill treatment of POW's or innocent civilians
in violation of the laws and customs of war would satisfy the
actus reus.16 The same is true for terrorism. Terrorism is generally
applied to conduct in circumstances of relative peacetime. The
exact same conduct would constitute either a war crime, a crime
against humanity, terrorism, or even a common crime,
depending on the circumstances in which it occurred. The
differentiating feature is the factual-legal context.
Intentional killing of a human being is murder in domestic
law.17 In common law systems, the intentional part is having
"malice aforethought," which may either be intent to kill or
killing with a "depraved heart."18 The exact same conduct -
intentionally killing a human being - is considered "justifiable"
during war, as long as that human being is an enemy combatant,
not one who is hors du combat.19 Killing a human being who is
hors du combat is a war crime during international or civil
war.20 The same conduct is a crime against humanity or
terrorism when committed when there is no "traditional" armed
conflict.21
When one is at war, the enemy combatant has the status of
an attacker. He is trying to kill and may be killed. Basic criminal
law allows deadly force to be used against another attacking
with deadly force.22 It is also self-defense in the international
law of war.2 3 On the other hand, if one is the initial attacker,
one cannot claim self-defense.24 To attack another state without
having been attacked violates jus ad bellum.25 Customary
restraints on warfare, jus in bello, are premised on the general
doctrine that destruction and violence that are superfluous to
actual military necessity are immoral and wasteful. Air
bombardment, for example, is subjected to constraints both in
relation to the selection of targets and to the accuracy of
bombardment.
Definition of Terrorism
I propose, therefore, to define terrorism as the use of
violence against innocent individuals to obtain some military,
political, or philosophical end from a third-party government or
group. If the violence is aimed at or wantonly impacts on
innocent civilians, it is terrorism, obviating any right to self-
defense. Innocents include non-combatants in war (war crime)
and non-attackers in a non-war setting (terrorism). Terrorism is
political or ideological violence without restraint of law or
morality during relative peacetime.
The essential commonality in all these offenses is that they
entail individual responsibility, with differing jurisdiction and,
perhaps, penalties.26
This is terrorism even if it is fully domestic, but it is
international terrorism only when the conduct transcends
borders, or is so massive or includes a use of weapons of mass
destruction, that it poses a threat to international peace and
security. N.
Christopher L. Blakesley is a professor of law at the Boyd School of
Law.
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